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Abstract This paper examines renegotiations of international climate agreements for car-
bon abatement. We explore coalition stability under ‘optimal transfers’ that have been sug-
gested to stabilise international environmental agreements (e.g. McGinty in Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers 59, 45–62, 2007). Such transfer schemes need to be refined when agreements
are renegotiated. We determine the requirements that transfers between signatories of an in-
ternational climate agreement must satisfy in order to stabilise the sequence of agreements
that performs best in terms of provision of the public good ‘carbon abatement’. If these re-
quirements are met, no country wants to change its membership status at any stage. In order
to demonstrate the applicability of our result we use the STACO model, a 12-regions global
model, to assess the impact of well-designed transfer rules on the stability of an interna-
tional climate agreement. Although there are strong free-rider incentives, we find a stable
grand coalition in the first commitment period in a game with one round of renegotiations if
renegotations take place sufficiently early.
Keywords Stability of coalitions · International environmental agreements · Partition
function approach · Sharing rules · Renegotiations · Climate agreements
1 Introduction
Efficient management of the global commons such as stability of climatic conditions and
the conservation of biodiversity requires a grand coalition of the nation states responsible
for environmental regulation and legislation. However, the grand coalition will generally
not be stable as individual countries have an incentive to take a free-rider position in the
provision of such global environmental goods. This paper examines the options to establish
a stable international climate agreement (ICA) that comes as close as possible to the first
best—but generally unstable—grand coalition. The notion of stability we employ is crucial.
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We use the concept of internal and external stability. A coalition is said to be stable if and
only if no coalition member has an incentive to leave (internal stability) and no non-member
has an incentive to join (external stability); cf. d’Aspremont et al. (1983). This notion of
stability is applicable when the membership decision is taken only once (and for all). As
we will relax this assumption and allow for renegotiations, we will introduce an appropriate
refinement of the stability concept in Sect. 2 below.
There exists by now an extensive literature on the stability of international environmen-
tal agreements. Here we focus on games where a single agreement is proposed that can
be signed or not. This class of games is usually called ‘cartel games with open member-
ship’. Different solution concepts have been employed to analyse this type of game. Hoel
(1992) considers a ‘constrained social optimum’ where social net benefits from greenhouse
gas (GHG) abatement are maximised subject to an individual rationality constraint that re-
quires that coalition members gain compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium. Eyckmans
(1999) examines coalition stability for uniform abatement efforts using a similar individ-
ual rationality constraint. Individual rationality is also a condition of the solution proposed
by Chander and Tulkens (1995), the γ -core. Here it is implicitly assumed that a coalition
would completely dissolve if a coalition member (or a subset of members) leaves. By con-
trast the notion of (internal and external) stability with single deviations implicitly assumes
that the remaining coalition stays intact if a coalition member leaves. One might call this a
pessimistic view where deviations occur whenever they are immediately profitable. In this
paper we adopt this pessimistic—or cautious—view.
We explore the stability of international climate agreements. As it is conventional in the
literature on international environmental agreements (e.g., Barrett 2005), we assume that
countries can make binding agreements and, hence, we do not consider enforcement. Each
player (countries or regions) chooses whether or not to sign the agreement and become a
member of a unique coalition (the climate agreement). Then the coalition and the remain-
ing singletons fix their abatement levels playing a Nash-Cournot game. As abatement is a
pure public good, the equilibrium of the abatement game is generally inefficient. Only the
coalition of all, the grand coalition, would overcome the inefficiency. The literature on car-
tel membership games has emphasised, however, that large coalitions, including the grand
coalition, are only stable if gains from cooperation are small. If, however, gains from coop-
eration are large, stable coalitions are small and achieve relatively little (e.g. Barrett 1994;
Finus and Rundshagen 2003). These results have been obtained for models with identical
players and do not generalise when players differ (Weikard 2009). Our results in this paper
are likewise in contrast to the earlier findings. We show that there are options to stabilise
successful ICAs. There are three main drivers of our result.
First, we consider asymmetric countries. With asymmetric countries, in particular when
countries differ in abatement cost, a coalition can exploit cheap abatement options if a low
cost country joins the coalition. Low cost countries are attractive as coalition partners.
Second, we consider transfers between coalition members. Transfers or, more precisely,
the sharing of the coalition payoff among members can be used to set incentives for low
cost countries to join the coalition. In the debate on climate change policies a number of
different sharing rules for international climate agreements have been suggested; see Rose
et al. (1998). Only few studies have addressed the impacts of different sharing rules on the
stability of international climate agreements. Bosello et al. (2003) consider sharing rules
for abatement costs, Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006) consider sharing rules for trad-
able emission permits and Weikard et al. (2006) consider sharing rules for the gains from
cooperation. The differences are crucial. If sharing rules are applied to costs or permits,
there is no guarantee that payoffs satisfy the individual rationality constraint. By contrast,
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if sharing is applied to the gains from cooperation, individual rationality is always satis-
fied as long as a coalition is at all profitable, i.e. it achieves at least the sum of what its
members can achieve without cooperation. Recently a class of sharing rules has been pro-
posed that divides the difference between the coalition payoff and the sum of the outside
option payoffs of coalition members (Carraro et al. 2006; McGinty 2007; Weikard 2009;
Fuentes-Albero and Rubio 2010). The outside option payoff is the payoff a player would
receive when leaving the coalition. It is obvious that the internal stability condition can only
be met when the coalition payoff exceeds the sum of the outside option payoffs. On the
other hand, if the coalition payoff exceeds the sum of the outside option payoffs, then well-
designed transfers can guarantee internal stability. Here we introduce an adjusted “optimal
sharing rule” designed for a setting with renegotiations.
Third, we allow for renegotiations of the agreement. Renegotiations improve the incen-
tives to join a coalition. Players may be forced to cooperate at the first stage if there is a
credible threat of punishment at the second stage. Moreover the second stage payoffs can be
used to reward members of the first-stage agreement. There is a small but growing literature
on renegotiations of international environmental agreements. Barrett (1994, 1999) considers
an infinitely repeated game. Contrary to what a folk theorem would suggest, full participa-
tion cannot generally be achieved because the option to renegotiate limits the threats of pun-
ishment. Asheim et al. (2006) use a similar model but allow for regional agreements. The
finding is that several regional agreements increase GHG abatement over one global agree-
ment but, again, full participation is generally not achieved. Asheim and Holtsmark (2009)
establish a “folk theorem” for a game with renegotiations and find full participation with
efficient abatement levels only for discount rates sufficiently close to 1. Ulph (2004) and
Rubio and Ulph (2007) have studied renegotiations of international environmental agree-
ments with a stock pollutant. They find that as the gains from cooperation increase over
time, participation declines. This reinforces Barrett’s (1994) findings. In a recent paper De
Zeeuw (2008) considers farsighted stability in a dynamic membership game and finds small
as well as large stable coalitions. However, all these approaches are confined to symmet-
ric countries and do not capture abatement cost differences and the impact of transfers to
stabilise agreements. Our paper complements the literature in this respect.
To study the effects of optimally designed sharing rules in an applied setting and to il-
lustrate their impacts we examine the stability of ICAs. We do this using the STACO model
introduced by Finus et al. (2006) and refined by Nagashima et al. (2009). STACO is a global
model comprising 12-regions for each of which abatement cost and benefit functions are
defined. The numerical analysis in this paper extends the work of Weikard et al. (2006) who
consider results from the STACO model and compare proportional sharing of gains from
cooperation according to past emissions, regional income, population and other indicators.
They find that an emission-based proportional sharing rule performs best in the sense that
it stabilises a coalition that gives higher global net benefits and lower stocks of carbon pol-
lution than any other of the examined rules. However, as only a limited set of rules was
examined in that study, it remained an open question whether coalitions can be stabilised
that perform even better. Our analysis in this paper shows that an optimal transfer rule gives
significantly better results. If we do not consider renegotiations, we find that there exist sta-
ble coalitions of up to 6 out of 12 regions. The best performing stable coalition comprises 5
regions and achieves about 46% of the gains the Grand Coalition could achieve as compared
to non-cooperation. With renegotiations, considering two commitment periods, we even find
a stable grand coalition in the first commitment period of 10 or 20 years, followed by a 5
regions coalition for the second commitment period. These agreements achieve 59% of the
potential gains over a century.
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The paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces optimal sharing rules for a
multi-period setting. This section contains our main theoretical contribution: an extension of
the internal-external stability concept and the characterisation of sharing rules that stabilise
the best performing coalitions that can possibly be stable in a setting with renegotiations.
Section 3 provides a brief overview of empirical specifications of the STACO model for our
case of ICAs. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Optimal sharing in Pareto perfect coalitions
We consider an open membership cartel formation game with renegotiations. That is, we
consider several but finitely many periods (commitment periods) in each of which a sin-
gle coalition or cartel (the ICA) can form. In each period t = 1, . . . , T individual countries
i ∈ N decide to join or not to join the agreement. Payoffs that accrue in period t depend on
the coalition formed in that period Kt ⊆ N . Payoffs are determined from costs and bene-
fits of equilibrium abatement of GHGs in an abatement game that is specified in the next
section. Here it is sufficient to note that GHG abatement is a public good. It is well known
for public goods games that the grand coalition K = N is efficient, while any partial agree-
ment with K ⊂ N is not (e.g. Dasgupta 1982). In a public goods game a singleton coalition
K = {i} will not be effective and give the same payoffs as K = ∅. We will refer to both
cases as ‘All-Singletons’. To be more precise about payoffs, the abatement game in period
t invokes a partition function V t(Kt) that determines payoffs V tK for the coalition and for
each singleton player V tj (Kt ), j /∈ Kt in period t . Before we can introduce our notion of
stability (of a sequence of coalitions) we need to define individual payoffs for coalition
members. We assume that some sharing rule r applies that distributes the coalition payoff
VK(K) among members.1 Thus we arrive at a per-member partition function, also com-
monly called ‘valuation function’. For convenience we denote it by V (rK) and individual
payoffs under coalition K when sharing rule r applies are denoted by Vi(rK). Of course,
for every sharing rule r we have VK(K) = ∑i∈K Vi(rK). We adopt the shorthand notation
K−i for K\{i} with i ∈ K and K+j for K ∪ {j} with j /∈ K . Define the coalition surplus
SK ≡ VK(K) − ∑i∈K Vi(K−i ). We call Vi(K−i ) i’s outside option payoff or defection pay-
off. Note that it is, of course, independent of the sharing rule applied by coalition K−i .
Now consider the final period T and consider a class of sharing rules for coalition KT
where each coalition member i ∈ KT receives at least its outside option payoff V Ti (KT−i ) and
a (non-negative) share sTi of the surplus if this is feasible, i.e. if SKT ≥ 0. Else, if SKT < 0,
losses will be shared. This class of sharing rules, referred to as ‘optimal sharing’, can be
formally described as follows:
V Ti (
rKT ) = V Ti (KT−i ) + sTi for all i ∈ KT ,
with
∑
i∈KT
sTi = SKT and (1)
for all i ∈ KT , sTi ≥ 0 if and only if SKT ≥ 0.2
Optimal sharing gives priority to setting incentives to join the agreement. Weikard (2009)
shows that every coalition that is internally stable under some arbitrary sharing rule will also
1We skip the time-superscript where it is not essential.
2The latter requirement has been labelled ‘Claim Rights Condition’ by Weikard (2009).
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be internally stable under the family of sharing rules characterised by (1). The underlying
standard notion of stability is as follows (d’Aspremont et al. 1983):
Definition 1 (i) A coalition K is internally stable under sharing rule r if and only if
Vi(
rK) ≥ Vi(K−i ) for all i ∈ K.
(ii) A coalition K is externally stable under sharing rule r if and only if
Vj (K) > Vj (
rK+j ) for all j ∈ N\K.3
(iii) A coalition K is stable for given sharing rules if and only if it is internally and
externally stable.
In a setting with renegotiations, the notion of stability of Definition 1 has to be refined.
First, the object of stability is no longer a coalition under a sharing rule r , but rather a
sequence of coalitions coupled with sharing rules 〈r1K1, . . . , rT KT 〉. We adopt the termi-
nology that coalition rKt is generalised stable under sharing rule r if no member wants
to leave and no non-member wants to join. It is important to note that generalised stability
of a coalition in a given period may depend on the coalitions formed and the sharing rules
applied in other periods and therefore Definition 1 does not apply but needs refinement.
The coalition formation game we study is a finite sequential game and the equilibrium
concept employed is Pareto perfect equilibrium introduced by Bernheim et al. (1987) and
Benoît and Krishna (1993). This equilibrium concept is a refinement of Selten’s (1965, 1975)
subgame perfect equilibrium that rules out the play of a Pareto dominated subgame in an
equilibrium path of play.4 Similar to the concept of subgame perfection, Pareto perfection
requires that a Pareto perfect equilibrium is played in every subgame—including subgames
that are off the equilibrium path of play. This implies that a punishment path of play, after a
deviation has occurred, must also be Pareto perfect. If we have multiple Pareto perfect equi-
libria, we assume that players will coordinate on a punishment path playing the equilibrium
that is worst for the deviating player.
Before formally defining Pareto perfect sequences of coalitions we need to introduce
some further notation and a definition of generalised stability.
Denote by wK˜Ti the stable and Pareto undominated coalition with sharing rule w that
gives the worst payoff of all stable coalitions to player i in period T , that is: V Ti (wK˜Ti ) ≤
V Ti (
rKT ) for all stable rKT . This payoff serves as a threat for player i in the preceding
period. It is a credible threat because, as wK˜Ti is stable, no player has an incentive to deviate
from this punishment strategy. Of course, i may or may not be a member of K˜Ti .
We can now recursively define generalised stability. A definition of Pareto perfect equi-
librium follows.
3The tie-breaking rule is here that a player would join the coalition if she is indifferent between joining
and staying out. Hence, by this definition, the empty set ∅ is not externally stable, and a trivial coalition is
internally stable.
4Benoît and Krishna (1993) use the term “renegotiation proof” that is commonly used in the context of
infinitely repeated games. They introduce the concept for two-player games. We extend the definition to n
players (Definition 3 below), but consider only single deviations. Hence we are not considering coalition
proofness (Bernheim et al. 1987).
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Definition 2 (i) In the last period T a coalition KT is generalised stable under sharing rule
rT if and only if it is stable.
(ii) A sequence of coalitions 〈rT −1KT −1, rT KT 〉 is generalised stable if and only if rT KT
is generalised stable, and for all i ∈ KT −1
V T −1i (
rT −1KT −1) + V Ti (r
T
KT ) ≥ V T −1i (KT −1−i ) + V Ti (wK˜Ti ), (2)
and for all j ∈ N\KT −1
V T −1j (K
T −1) + V Tj (r
T
KT ) > V T −1j (
sT −1KT −1+j ) + V Tj (wK˜Tj ). (3)
(iii) For longer sequences conditions for generalised stability are established by working
backwards from (2) and (3). Let Wti be the payoff of the worst generally stable coalition
sequence for player i from time t onward.
A sequence of coalitions of length T − t + 1, i.e. 〈rt Kt , . . . , rT KT 〉, is generalised stable
if the subsequence of length T − t , i.e. 〈rt+1Kt+1, . . . , rT KT 〉, is generalised stable and if for
all i ∈ Kt
V ti (
rt Kt ) +
T∑
τ=t+1
V τi (
rτ Kτ ) ≥ V ti (Kt−i ) + Wt+1i ,
and for all j ∈ N\Kt
V tj (K
t ) +
T∑
τ=t+1
V τj (
rτ Kτ ) > V tj (
st Kt+j ) + Wt+1j .
Definition 3 (i) In the last period, coalition KT is Pareto perfect under sharing rule rT if
and only if it is stable and Pareto undominated by any other stable coalition.
(ii) A sequence of coalitions 〈rt Kt , . . . , rT KT 〉 is Pareto perfect if and only if it is gen-
eralised stable and Pareto undominated by any other generalised stable sequence stretch-
ing from t to T and all its subsequences 〈rt−1Kt−1, . . . , rT KT 〉, 〈rt−2Kt−2, . . . , rT KT 〉,
. . . , 〈rT KT 〉 are generalised stable and Pareto undominated.
In the remainder of the paper we confine the analysis to a two-period game, T = 2. To
extend the analysis to more periods is straightforward, based on Definitions 2 and 3, but
tedious.
For T = 2,V 2i (wK˜2i ) is the worst credible punishment that can be imposed on i in pe-
riod 2. Condition (2) requires of a Pareto perfect equilibrium 〈r1K1, r2K2〉 that the payoff of
a period-1 coalition member (left hand side) is at least as large as the payoff from defecting
from coalition K1 (right hand side). It is a credible threat that wK˜2i will be played as it is a
Pareto perfect subgame equilibrium. Condition (3) requires that a singleton player in period
1 receives at least as much as when entering coalition K1. Conditions (2) and (3) are gen-
eralisations of the notions of internal and external stability, respectively. In what follows we
will sometimes say “coalition K1 is generalised stable” in place of the correct but lengthy
phrase “coalition K1 is part of a generalised stable sequence of coalitions”. This just means
that no member of K1 has an incentive to leave and no non-member has an incentive to join.
Using Definition 2 we can now establish a condition to determine whether for a given se-
quence of partition functions we can find valuations (or sharing rules) such that a sequence
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of coalitions is Pareto perfect. For simplicity we restrict the exposition to a time invari-
ant partition function. Again, generalisations are straightforward but involve more tedious
notation.5
First, we focus on generalised internal stability. From condition (2) we can see that a
coalition K1 can only be part of a generalised stable sequence if each member of K1 receives
at least its defection payoff
Di(K
1) ≡ Vi(K1−i ) + Vi(wK˜2i ).
Therefore, a necessary condition for generalised internal stability of K1 is that the sum of
payoffs of the coalition members is at least as large as the sum of their defection payoffs:
∑
i∈K1
(
Vi(
r1K1) + Vi(r2K2)
)
≥
∑
i∈K1
Di(K
1). (4)
Generalised stability of K1 depends upon defection payoffs of the members of K1 and
the sharing rule r2 applied in period 2; the latter only if there is some i ∈ K1 ∩ K2. The
defection payoff is further specified by the partition function that determines the payoffs of
the singleton players and, hence, the period-1 outside option payoff of i ∈ K1, i.e. Vi(K1−i )
is independent of sharing. If player i ∈ K1 defects, then its period-2 payoff is Vi(wK˜2i ). If
the player is singleton, i.e. i /∈ K˜2i , the payoff is independent of the sharing rule w. If i ∈ K˜2i ,
then sharing rule w applies and i receives the worst possible payoff compatible with Pareto
perfection of wK˜2i .
The next step in our argument is to determine how sharing in coalitions K1 and K2 can
be arranged such that condition (4) is met in all cases where this is possible for a given
partition function. To achieve this, the sharing rule r2 applied to K2 should distribute the
coalition surplus SK2 entirely to ‘permanent’ members, i.e. members in K1 ∩ K2, leaving
members of K2 that are not members of K1 with their outside option payoff. Intuitively
this rewards coalition members of the first period and lowers their incentive for defection.
Hence, by construction we have the following:
Proposition 1 (i) Consider a Pareto perfect period-2 coalition K2. Suppose sharing in pe-
riod 2 is arranged such that
∑
i∈K1∩K2 Vi(
r2K2) = SK2 . Then, if for such K2 and r2 condi-
tion (4) is not met, then 〈r1K1, r2K2〉 is not generalised internally stable and cannot be a
Pareto perfect equilibrium for any sequence of sharing rules r1, r2.
(ii) Again, let K2 be Pareto perfect. Suppose sharing in period 2 is arranged as stated
under (i). Then, if for such K2 and r2 condition (4) is met for K1, then there exists a sharing
rule r1∗ such that 〈r1∗K1, r2K2〉 is generalised internally stable.
Proof Part (i) follows from the construction of S. Part (ii) follows from the fact that in (4)
the period-1 coalition payoff
∑
i∈K1 Vi(
r1K1) is independent of r1 and from the fact that
there is no restriction on r1. Hence, as long as (4) holds, the period-1 coalition payoff VK1
can always be distributed in a way to meet the generalised internal stability condition (2) for
each and every i ∈ K1. 
Proposition 1 allows us to identify all coalitions that can be generalised stable for a given
partition function. We call a sharing rule that satisfies (2) for all i ∈ K1 whenever (4) is
5Note that the partition function we use in Sects. 3 and 4 is not time-invariant.
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satisfied an “optimal sharing rule”. Optimal sharing requires that r1∗ is chosen such that
Vi(
r1∗K1) ≥ Di(K1) − Vi(r2K2) for all i ∈ K1.
Next, we turn to external stability. The following proposition establishes that external
stability, condition (3), is of little concern when an optimal sharing rule is applied.
Proposition 2 Consider a Pareto perfect period-2 equilibrium r2K2. If K1 is generalised
externally unstable under an optimal sharing rule r1 (applied to K1+j ) such that there exists
j /∈ K1 with Vj (K1) + Vj (r2K2) ≤ Vj (r1K1+j ) + Vj (wK˜2j ), meaning that j prefers to enter
coalition K1 under sharing rule r1, then the enlarged coalition r1K1+j will be generalised
internally stable (and the equilibrium played in the continuation game is r2K2).
Proof By assumption Vj (r1K1+j ) + Vj (wK˜2j ) ≥ Vj (K1) + Vj (r2K2). By definition
Vj (
wK˜2j ) ≤ Vj (r2K2). Hence, we have Vj (r1K1+j ) + Vj (r2K2) ≥ Vj (K1) + Vj (wK˜2j ) which
is what, according to (2), generalised internal stability of K1+j requires. Furthermore, r1 is
an optimal sharing rule, if (2) applies to j , then it applies to all i ∈ r1K1+j . 
Propositions 1 and 2 allow us to identify the largest (or most successful) Pareto perfect
coalitions in a coalition formation game for the provision public goods. To this we turn now.
As a model with heterogeneous players does not readily yield general analytical characteri-
sations of stable coalitions, we resort to numerical simulations.
3 Numerical model and data
This section and the next provide an application. We identify the best Pareto perfect equi-
libria in a greenhouse gas abatement game, that is, we identify a sequence of interna-
tional climate agreements that is generalised stable and that achieves a higher global pay-
off than other generalised stable agreements. The stage game we consider is standard in
this domain (e.g. Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994; Botteon and Carraro 1997;
Rubio and Ulph 2007). It consists of a membership game followed by an abatement game.
We explore this game as a one-shot game (i.e. with one commitment period) and with one
round of renegotiation (i.e. with two commitment periods). Formally, in the stage game we
have a set of regions N = {1,2, . . . , n}. At the beginning of commitment period t (t = 1,2)
each player i chooses from a strategy set σ ti ∈ {0,1};σ ti = 0 means that i is not joining the
ICA in period t ; σ ti = 1 means that i joins the ICA in period t . As before, we denote by
Kt ⊆ N the set of coalition members (signatories) in commitment period t . Now consider
a given coalition Kt . Chander and Tulkens (1995) call this a ‘partial agreement’. In the
period-t abatement game members of Kt act like a single player and maximise their joint
payoff. They adopt GHG abatement paths which are jointly optimal responses to others’
abatement paths.6 Other players, the singletons, maximise individual payoffs. They adopt
abatement paths which are optimal responses to others’ emissions. Generally we denote i’s
GHG abatement path in period t by q¯ ti . The period-t Nash equilibrium abatement strategy is
denoted by q¯∗ti (Kt ). The abatement game described generates a partition function that gives
6McEvoy and Stranlund (2009) point out that this type of game does not address the compliance problem
within the coalition, but typically assumes that the coalition can enforce members’ assigned abatement targets
costlessly.
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payoffs for the coalition and the singletons for every coalition that may form.7 Generally,
each player receives benefits bi from total abatement q¯ t = ∑i∈N q¯ti and incurs costs ci for
own abatement q¯ ti . A singleton player under coalition Kt receives
V ti (K
t ) = bti (q¯∗t (Kt )) − cti (q¯∗ti (Kt )), for all i ∈ N\Kt. (5)
The coalition payoff is given by
V tKt (K
t ) =
∑
i∈Kt
(bti (q¯
∗t (Kt )) − cti (q¯∗ti (Kt ))). (6)
The partition function on which the stability analysis is based arises from the abatement
game characterised by (5) and (6).
To further specify the model, we adopt the STACO-model introduced by Finus et al.
(2006) and refined by Nagashima et al. (2009) and Weikard et al. (2010). Here, we focus
on the main features of the model; in an Appendix we provide details on the specifica-
tion of the benefit and abatement cost functions. We consider twelve world regions: USA
(USA), Japan (JPN), European Union-15 (EU15), other OECD countries (OOE), Eastern
European countries (EET), former Soviet Union (FSU), energy exporting countries (EEX),
China (CHN), India (IND), dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil (BRA) and rest of the
world (ROW). We account for benefits from abatement to infinity, but adopt a finite plan-
ning horizon of 100 years, ranging from 2011 to 2110, for determining abatement paths.
This reflects the fact that fossil fuels, the main source of GHG emissions, are depletable.
In this setting the intertemporal aspects of climate change are well reflected. Benefits from
abatement are avoided damages which, in turn, depend on stock of CO2; each region re-
ceives a share of global benefits. Marginal benefits can be assumed to be constant. Marginal
abatement costs are assumed to be a quadratic function of the region’s own abatement level.
The assumption of linear benefits implies that regions have dominant strategies; the optimal
response functions do neither depend on the actions of other players, nor on the stock of
greenhouse gases. We calibrate the model as far as possible (regional emission and GDP
paths, regional abatement costs) on the MIT-EPPA model (Babiker et al. 2001 and Ellerman
and Decaux 1998), but as this model does not contain a damage cost module, we have to
rely on other sources (mainly Nordhaus and Boyer 2001 and Tol 1997) for calibrating the
benefits from abatement; see Nagashima et al. (2009) and Dellink et al. (2009) for more
details.
4 Results and discussion
This section presents the results of coalition formation for the STACO game with one com-
mitment period (4.1) and two commitment periods (4.2).
4.1 Optimal sharing in the one-shot game
In the one-shot game, coalition members commit to abatement and transfer paths for the full
planning period of 100 years. We find 108 out of 212 − 12 = 4084 coalitions are stable and
7One qualification is needed. The partial agreement abatement game generates a partition function only if it
has a unique solution. This condition is satisfied in the empirical setting of the STACO model, see Weikard
et al. (2010).
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Table 1 Best performing stable coalitions—one-shot game
Coalition members NPV of payoff
[Billion US$]
Concentrations
2110 [ppm]
All-Singletonsa 5238 680
Grand Coalitiona 15211 612
USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 9830 659
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND 9810 659
EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND 9701 659
EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 9697 659
USA, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA 9613 660
EU15, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN, BRA 9486 660
USA, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA 9484 660
EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, DAE, BRA 9484 660
USA, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN 9469 660
EU15, EEX, CHN, IND, BRA 9455 660
aAll-Singletons and Grand Coalition are not stable
Pareto undominated. In Table 1 we present net present values (NPVs) and resulting CO2
concentrations for the benchmark cases (All-Singletons and Grand Coalition) and for the
stable coalitions that perform best in terms of global NPV of payoffs.
With asymmetric players, as in our setting, global payoff does not just depend on the
number of players in the coalition but also on their characteristics. For instance, coalitions
where China is a member will generally implement higher abatement levels than coalitions
where China is not involved. As China’s marginal abatement costs are low compared to other
regions, the efficient division of abatement efforts will involve a substantial contribution of
China. In fact, China appears as member in all ten best-performing coalitions. Of course,
China’s involvement in a coalition requires sufficient availability of transfers—else China
would prefer to take a free-rider position. We find China in 50 out of 108 stable coalitions.
Table 2 provides more detailed information for the non-cooperative (“All-Singletons”)
case, which is unstable, and for the best performing stable coalition. We report abatement
levels and payoffs for individual regions. As a reference, abatement in 2011 and discounted
payoffs are reported. Also reported is the Incentive to change membership. This indicator
measures the change in payoff a region obtains when it unilaterally switches from being
a member to being singleton or vice versa. When the incentive to change membership is
positive for any region, it would prefer to change and thus the coalition is unstable. The
best performing coalition consists of the USA, Central and Eastern European Countries in
Transition (EET), China, India and the Dynamic Asian Economies (DAE). All regions are
better off under partial cooperation than in the non-cooperative situation, showing that the
gains from cooperation are substantial.
The member with the highest marginal benefits from abatement in the best performing
equilibrium is the USA; thus, the transfer scheme involves a payment from the USA to
the other regions, as shown in Table 2. China’s low marginal abatement costs induce a huge
abatement effort by China and the associated costs are largely funded by the transfer scheme.
Japan and EU15 are the main beneficiaries from this coalition and take a free-rider po-
sition. They do not increase their abatement efforts, but benefit much from the fact that
coalition members abate more than under All-Singletons. This reflects the public good char-
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Table 2 Key results for selected coalitions—one-shot gamea
All-Singletons Coalition of USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE
Abatement
in 2011
[% of BaU
emissions]
NPV of
payoff
[Billion US$]
Abatement
in 2011
[% of BaU
emissions]
NPV of
payoff
[Billion US$]
NPV of
transfer
[Billion US$]
Incentive to change
membership
(NPV)
[Billion US$]
USA 9.9 1117 13.2 1603 −663 −9
JPN 2.5 943 2.5 1933 0 −207
EU15 7.6 1240 7.6 2595 0 −274
OOE 5.6 188 5.6 386 0 −19
EET 4.4 71 28.7 138 64 −1
FSU 6.7 362 6.7 749 0 −59
EEX 1.9 164 1.9 336 0 −15
CHN 14.8 298 50.1 415 452 −2
IND 10.5 268 37.8 485 83 −3
DAE 1.9 136 18.1 261 64 −1
BRA 0.1 84 0.1 172 0 −4
ROW 6.3 365 6.3 755 0 −60
Global 8.0 5238 16.9 9830 0 −654
aBold numbers indicate membership
acteristic of abatement. Thus, their incentive to join the coalition (to change membership) is
large and negative.
4.2 Optimal sharing in the renegotiation game
4.2.1 Renegotiations after 50 years
As discussed in the introduction, renegotiations may influence the outcome as players can
change their membership decision. Introducing a round of renegotiations after 50 years may
induce larger coalitions at the first stage, as non-cooperative behaviour may be punished by
playing a worse equilibrium at the second stage.
Table 3 shows that there are multiple equilibria at the second stage. This opens possi-
bilities for punishment and brings about a huge number of equilibria at the first stage. Ta-
ble 3 reports NPVs of payoffs for the 10 best performing Pareto perfect coalition sequences
(PPCs). The table offers a number of interesting observations.
First, although the second stage of the game has a shorter time horizon than the one-shot
game, the best performing equilibrium coalitions are largely the same. The best perform-
ing generalised stable coalitions at the first stage are, however, more ambitious. While in
the one-shot game 46% of the potential gain from cooperation can be reaped, the two-stage
game can close the gap between All-Singletons and the Grand Coalition by 57%. The com-
bination of renegotiations and a scheme of optimal transfers makes a significant difference.
In comparison, a two-stage game with an exogenous transfer rule can only reap 25% of the
potential gain (cf. Weikard et al. 2010).
Secondly, the three best performing PPCs (and many other PPCs) contain one of the three
high damage regions (USA, Japan or EU15) at the first stage but a different high damage
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Table 3 Best performing stable coalitions—renegotiations after 50 years
Coalition members NPV of payoff [billion US$]
1st stage 2nd stage 1st st. 2nd st. Total
JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 6528 4409 10937
JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND 6528 4402 10930
EU15, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 6511 4409 10920
EU15, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND 6511 4402 10912
JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW EU15, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 6528 4352 10880
USA, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN, IND, ROW USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 6469 4409 10878
JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW EU15, OOE, EET, CHN, IND 6528 4346 10874
USA, EET, EEX, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 6463 4409 10872
USA, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN, IND, ROW EU15, EET, EEX, CHN, IND 6469 4402 10871
USA, OOE, EET, FSU, EEX, CHN, IND USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 6458 4409 10868
region at the second stage. Notice that these regions have strong free-rider incentives and
therefore face a severe punishment at the second stage if they defect at the first stage. Hence,
they can be “persuaded” to join the coalition at the first stage. Free-riding at both stages has
become more difficult due to the possibility of punishment.
Thirdly, as argued in Sect. 2, permanent members can share the entire surplus in the last
period leaving temporary members with their outside option payoff. This reward gives an
additional incentive to second stage coalition members to join already at the first stage: EET,
China and India are present in all 10 best performing PPCs at both stages. For the regions
with high marginal benefits, this reward is not always sufficient to compensate for the large
free-rider incentives and the high transfers that they have to pay when joining a coalition.
Thus, we find that especially the OECD regions are just temporary members of a climate
coalition.
Table 4 gives the main regional results for the best performing sequence of coalitions. As
there are no punishments at the second (last) stage by definition, the equilibria at this stage
are not only self-enforcing, but also individually beneficial: all players are worse off when
they leave the coalition, though the differences are sometimes small. This can be seen from
the negative incentives to change membership at the second stage. Note also that the USA, as
the only non-permanent member at the second stage, only receives its outside option payoff
(the permanent members divide the surplus), and thus its incentive to change membership at
this stage is exactly zero.
The punishment options are clearly visible in the incentives to change membership for
the coalition members at the first stage. All temporary coalition members would be better
off if they could free-ride and leave the coalition. Their decision is, however, not based on
a simple comparison of net benefits at the first stage, but on their net benefits over the full
century. The possibility to punish free-riders at the second stage induces the cooperation of
regions that would rather prefer to free-ride at the first stage. The permanent members can
also be forced into cooperation using the “stick” of punishment, but they also benefit from
the “carrot” of dividing the surplus that is generated at both stages among themselves.
As in the one-shot game, the non-participating OECD regions, in this case USA at the
first stage and EU15 at both stages, benefit strongly from the coalition that is formed, as their
climate damages are substantially reduced, while their own abatement costs are moderate.
The pattern of transfers across coalition members is in line with expectations: the regions
with large marginal benefits gain from the high abatement levels in the regions with low
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Table 4 Key results for the coalition of {JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND, DAE, ROW} and {USA, EET,
CHN, IND, DAE} for the first and second stage, respectively—renegotiations after 50 yearsa
Abatement NPV of payoff NPV of transfer Incentive to change
membership (NPV)2011
[% of BaU
emissions]
2061
[% of BaU
emissions]
1st com-
mitment
period
[Billion
US$]
2nd com-
mitment
period
[Billion
US$]
1st com-
mitment
period
[Billion
US$]
2nd com-
mitment
period
[Billion
US$]
1st com-
mitment
period
[Billion
US$]
2nd com-
mitment
period
[Billion
US$]
USA 9.9 8.7 1701 722 0 −295 −266.2 0.0
JPN 6.5 2.6 657 865 −668 0 436.1 −90.7
EU15 7.6 5.7 1817 1161 0 0 −273.3 −120.2
OOE 21.0 2.9 164 173 −47 0 87.2 −8.4
EET 33.0 17.3 122 62 80 28 −25.3 −0.7
FSU 18.4 5.0 291 336 −126 0 170.6 −25.9
EEX 1.9 1.7 235 150 0 0 −31.0 −6.7
CHN 59.0 26.8 447 188 583 200 −149.9 −2.3
IND 44.2 16.9 450 219 194 38 −107.4 −2.6
DAE 21.8 13.0 233 117 108 29 −50.4 −1.4
BRA 0.1 0.1 120 77 0 0 −18.4 −1.6
ROW 20.8 4.4 293 338 −125 0 171.9 −26.2
Global 21.5 11.0 6528 4409 0 0
aBold numbers indicate membership
marginal abatement costs and co-finance abatement there. Furthermore, permanent mem-
bers appropriate the entire surplus generated by the coalition, and thus transfers tend to go
from temporary members to permanent members. Coalitional maximisation requires that
marginal abatement costs are equal across coalition members and equal to the sum of mar-
ginal benefits of all coalition members. For singletons, marginal abatement costs equal their
own marginal benefits.
4.2.2 Optimal renegotiation time
Earlier renegotiations may induce even larger coalitions at the first stage. A longer second
stage increases the threats that can be imposed on regions at the first stage. The generalised
stable coalitions of the first stage are generally more ambitious than the stable coalitions
of the second stage (see also Weikard et al. 2010). A shortening of the first stage may not
increase the performance of the resulting equilibria over the century. It may, however, boost
cooperation at the first stage. While earlier renegotiations thus increase threats that help to
stabilise larger coalitions, later renegotiations maintain the benefits of a larger first stage
coalition for longer. As these two mechanisms work in opposite directions, there is an opti-
mal renegotiation moment where the additional benefit from high abatement levels balances
with prolonged abatement at the first stage.
We find that the moment of renegotiation only affects the equilibria that emerge in the
first commitment period, as shown in Table 5. Stability in the second commitment period
is robust with respect to the length of the period. In the first commitment period, however,
the possibilities for credible punishment are crucial for the stabilisation of more ambitious
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Table 5 Key results for different moments of renegotiations
Renegotiations
after . . . years
Best performing PPC
Members 1st commitment period Members 2nd
commitment
period
NPV of
payoff
[billion US$]
Concentra-
tions 2110
[ppm]
10 USA, JPN, EU15, OOE, EET, FSU,
EEX, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA, ROW
USA, EET, CHN,
IND, DAE
10451 657
20 USA, JPN, EU15, OOE, EET, FSU,
EEX, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA, ROW
USA, EET, CHN,
IND, DAE
11073 654
30 USA, JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, EEX,
CHN, IND, DAE, BRA, ROW
USA, EET, CHN,
IND, DAE
11431 654
40 USA, EET, FSU, EEX, CHN, IND,
DAE, BRA, ROW
USA, EET, CHN,
IND, DAE
11238 655
50 JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, CHN, IND,
DAE, ROW
USA, EET, CHN,
IND, DAE
10937 655
60 USA, EET, EEX, CHN, IND, ROW USA, EET, CHN,
IND, DAE
10647 656
70 USA, OOE, EET, EEX, CHN, IND USA, EET, CHN,
IND, DAE
10397 657
80 EU15, EET, CHN, IND, ROW USA, EET, CHN,
IND, DAE
10096 657
90 USA, EET, EEX, CHN, IND USA, EET, CHN,
IND, DAE
9938 658
coalitions: the later the renegotiations, the weaker the threats and hence the less ambitious
the best performing PPCs.
When the renegotiation moment is sufficiently early, the Grand Coalition can be sta-
bilised in the first commitment period. In fact, most large coalitions are generalised stable
when renegotiations are held after 10 or 20 years, including the 11-player coalitions where
Brazil or Japan free-ride. The intuition behind this result is that these two regions have very
steep marginal abatement cost curves. Their participation in the coalition requires that, even
though they are temporary members and will not get more than their outside-option payoff,
a substantial share of the surplus generated by the coalition would go to these regions to
compensate their high abatement costs. But their participation would hardly benefit other
regions, as their abatement levels would remain relatively small.
Because the larger stable coalitions exist for a shorter first commitment period, they
do not contribute very much to the payoff over the entire planning horizon. Although the
Grand Coalition is stabilised when renegotiations are held after 20 years, only 59% of the
total potential gains of cooperation are reaped (100% at the first stage, 46% at the second
stage). The best moment to renegotiate, in terms of maximising payoff of the best performing
PPC, is after 30 years: this balances a sufficiently long first commitment period to enable
prolonged strong abatement policies with sufficiently high threats to ensure stability of this
ambitious coalition in the first commitment period. In this case, 62% of the potential gains
of cooperation are reaped. By contrast, for renegotiations after 90 years only 47% of the
potential gains can be reaped—hardly better than what can be achieved in the one-shot
game.
The regional results of the overall best performing PPCs are presented Table 6. The most
striking result is that all signatories that are not remaining in the coalition at the second
stage would have an incentive to leave the coalition at the first stage if they would not be
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Table 6 Key results for the coalition of {USA, JPN, OOE, EET, FSU, EEX, CHN, IND, DAE, BRA, ROW}
and {USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE} at the first and second stage, respectively—renegotiations after 30 years
Abatement NPV of payoff NPV of transfer Incentive to change
membership (NPV)2011
[% of BaU
emissions]
2061
[% of BaU
emissions]
1st com-
mitment
period
[Billion
US$]
2nd com-
mitment
period
[Billion
US$]
1st com-
mitment
period
[Billion
US$]
2nd com-
mitment
period
[Billion
US$]
1st com-
mitment
period
[Billion
US$]
2nd com-
mitment
period
[Billion
US$]
USA 19.7 10.6 1570 1071 323 −434 −425.9 −5.9
JPN 9.4 2.8 353 1282 −779 0 650.2 −135.5
EU15 7.6 6.5 1577 1721 0 0 −291.5 −179.3
OOE 26.1 3.8 90 256 −73 0 130.0 −12.5
EET 41.4 20.7 76 92 60 41 8.0 −0.5
FSU 22.9 5.3 153 497 −170 0 254.4 −38.7
EEX 23.9 1.8 76 223 −22 0 113.1 −10.0
CHN 76.5 30.6 359 277 688 296 −94.0 −1.5
IND 56.6 21.3 303 322 128 54 −1.9 −1.8
DAE 29.2 15.1 148 173 65 42 11.2 −1.0
BRA 5.1 0.1 44 114 −52 0 57.7 −2.4
ROW 26.5 4.9 154 501 −168 0 256.3 −39.2
Global 30.4 12.8 4902 6529 0 0
Bold numbers indicate membership
punished at the second stage. For some regions, abatement levels are very large at the first
stage, especially for China and India. In the absence of transfers, China would lose more
than 300 billion US$ on their own abatement efforts.8 Clearly, they need to be compensated
for this with substantial transfers. Japan is willing to provide these transfers, as its benefits
from global abatement are very high. The USA has a prominent position in this equilibrium:
they benefit from the large credible threats that enforce an ambitious coalition at the first
stage, and they benefit from the division of surplus among permanent members. In absolute
terms (NPV of payoff), they are the main beneficiary of the agreement, together with the
European Union (EU15), who benefit from free-riding.
Figure 1 shows the time profile of annual global abatement percentages for the best
performing PPC of the different specifications and, for comparison, for the All-Singletons
case.9 In line with the observations made in Table 5, more effective coalitions are estab-
lished in the first commitment period, and after renegotiations abatement levels fall back
to the level of the 5-player coalition of the second commitment period. The figure clearly
shows the trade-off between level of ambition and duration of the first commitment period. It
8This can be seen in the table as the payoff minus the transfers received.
9In all cases, abatement percentages are falling for the first 7 decades, but increase slightly thereafter. The
falling percentages are caused by increases in baseline emission levels that have a bigger impact than the
increased abatement levels induced by technological progress. The slowdown of emission growth in the later
decades causes abatement percentages to slightly increase towards the end of the century (cf. Nagashima et
al. 2009).
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Fig. 1 Global emission reductions in percentages for the All-Singletons case and the best performing PPCs
in the different simulations
also shows that an optimal transfer scheme is able to induce substantially higher abatement
levels throughout the century than when no agreement is signed.
5 Conclusion
Although our analysis employs a cautious equilibrium concept—we assume that a re-
gion would defect from a coalition if its free-rider payoff is larger than its payoff in the
coalition—, we find equilibria with a large degree of cooperation. Our findings are in con-
trast to many other studies that find only small stable coalitions consisting of no more than
two or three players; see e.g. Barrett’s (1994) theoretical analysis and the analysis of Fi-
nus et al. (2006) using the STACO model. There are three main drivers of our results. First,
a well-designed transfer scheme is a useful tool to stabilise larger coalitions, as in our setting
players differ in marginal benefits and marginal costs. Second, the transfer scheme that we
suggest is specifically designed to increase the incentives to join the coalition. With such
optimal transfers internal stability can be achieved for the largest possible set of coalitions.
Third, we introduce renegotiations. Multiple equilibria at the second stage can be used as a
threat to force potential free-riders into cooperation at the first stage. Together, these sticks
and carrots provide substantial incentives for regions to join international climate agree-
ments.
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Appendix
A full description of the STACO model without renegotiations and details on the calibration
procedure are provided by Dellink et al. The model with renegotiations is discussed in more
detail in Weikard et al. (2010). Here, we provide a brief summary of the elements that
are used to calculate the benefits and costs of abatement. All parameters are introduced in
Table 7.
A.1 Benefits and costs of abatement in STACO-2.2
Development of the global stock of CO2 as a function of abatement
Mt(Mt−1, q1, . . . , qt ) = M¯ + (1 − δ) · (Mt−1(q1, . . . , qt−1) − M¯) + ω ·
n∑
i=1
(e¯it − qit )
Global damages as a function of stock of CO2
dt (Mt) =
[
γ1 + γ2 ·
(
Mt(q1, . . . , qt )
M¯
)]
· (γD · yt )
Table 7 STACO model parameters
SymbolDescription Value Unit Source
M¯ Pre-industrial level of CO2 stock 590 GtC Nordhaus (1994)
Mt0 Stock of CO2 in 2010, starting point
for calculations
835 GtC Nordhaus (1994)
e¯it Business As Usual (BAU) emissions GtC Paltsev et al. (2005)
δ Natural annual removal rate of CO2
stock
0.00866– Nordhaus (1994)
ω Airborne fraction of emissions
remaining in the atmosphere
0.64 – Nordhaus (1994)
r Discount rate 0.02 – Assumption
θi Share of region i in global benefits see Table 8, column 4 Own calculation based on
Fankhauser (1995) and Tol (1997)
αi Abatement cost parameter of region i see Table 8, column 2 Own calculation based on Ellerman
and Decaux (1998)
βi Abatement cost parameter of region i see Table 8, column 3 Own calculation based on Ellerman
and Decaux (1998)
ς Technological progress parameter 0.005 – Assumption
γD Scale parameter of damage and
benefit function
0.027 – Tol (1997)
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Table 8 Regional parameters
Regions Parameter of
abatement cost
αi
Parameter of
abatement cost
βi
Parameter of
benefit function
θi
USA 0.0005 0.0398 0.226
JPN 0.0155 1.8160 0.173
EU15 0.0024 0.1503 0.236
OOE 0.0083 0 0.035
EET 0.0079 0.0486 0.013
FSU 0.0023 0.0042 0.067
EEX 0.0032 0.3029 0.030
CHN 0.00007 0.0239 0.062
IND 0.0015 0.0787 0.050
DAE 0.0047 0.3774 0.025
BRA 0.5612 8.4974 0.015
ROW 0.0021 0.0805 0.068
Global and regional benefits
bt (q1, . . . , qt ) = dt (Mt(0)) − dt (Mt(q1, . . . , qt ))
bit (q1, . . . , qt ) = θi · bt (q1, . . . , qt )
Abatement costs
cit (qit ) = 13 · αi · (1 − ς)
t · q3it +
1
2
· βi · (1 − ς)t · q2it
Discounted benefits
Bi(q) ≡
∞∑
t=1
{
(1 + r)−t · bit (q)
}
Discounted abatement costs
Ci(qi) ≡
∞∑
t=1
{
(1 + r)−t · cit (qit )
}
References
Altamirano-Cabrera, J.-C., & Finus, M. (2006). Permit trading and stability of international climate agree-
ments. Journal of Applied Economics, 9, 19–47.
Asheim, G. B., & Holtsmark, B. (2009). Renegotiation-proof climate agreements with full participation:
Conditions for Pareto efficiency. Environmental and Resource Economics, 43, 519–533.
Asheim, G. B., Bretteville Froyn, C., Hovi, J., & Menz, F. C. (2006). Regional versus global cooperation for
climate control. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 51, 93–109.
Ann Oper Res (2014) 220:49–68 67
Babiker, M. H., Reilly, J. M., Mayer, M., Eckaus, R. S., Wing, I. S., & Hyman, R. C. (2001). The MIT emis-
sions prediction and policy analysis (EPPA) model: revisions, sensitivities and comparison of results.
MIT joint program on the science and policy of global change. Report No. 71, Cambridge.
Barrett, S. (1994). Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxford Economic Papers, 46, 878–
894.
Barrett, S. (1999). A theory of full international cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 11(4), 519–541.
Barrett, S. (2005). Environment and statecraft—the strategy of environmental treaty-making. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Benoît, J.-P., & Krishna, V. (1993). Renegotiation in finitely repeated games. Econometrica, 61, 303–323.
Bernheim, B. D., Peleg, B., & Whinston, M. D. (1987). Coalition-proof Nash equilibria I. Concepts. Journal
of Economic Theory, 42, 1–12.
Bosello, F., Buchner, B., & Carraro, C. (2003). Equity, development and climate change control. Journal of
the European Economic Association, 1(2–3), 600–611.
Botteon, M., & Carraro, C. (1997). Burden-sharing and coalition stability in environmental negotiations with
asymmetric countries. In C. Carraro (Ed.), Environmental policy, international agreements and interna-
tional trade (pp. 26–55). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Carraro, C., & Siniscalco, D. (1993). Strategies for international protection of the environment. Journal of
Public Economics, 52, 309–328.
Carraro, C., Eyckmans, J., & Finus, M. (2006). Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international
environmental agreements. Review of International Organizations, 1, 379–396.
Chander, P., & Tulkens, H. (1995). A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on
transfrontier pollution. International Tax and Public Finance, 2, 279–293.
Dasgupta, P. (1982). The control of resources. Oxford: Blackwell.
d’Aspremont, C., Jaquemin, A., Gabszewicz, J. J., & Weymark, J. A. (1983). On the stability of collusive
price leadership. Canadian Journal of Economics, 16(1), 17–25.
Dellink, R., Nagashima, M., Van Ierland, E., Hendrix, E., Saiz, E., & Weikard, H.-P. (2009). STACO technical
document 2: Model description and calibration of STACO-2.1. www.enr.wur.nl/uk/staco. Wageningen:
Wageningen University.
De Zeeuw, A. (2008). Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 55, 163–174.
Ellerman, A. D., & Decaux, A. (1998). Analysis of post-Kyoto CO2 emissions trading using marginal abate-
ment curves (MIT Report #40). Cambridge: MIT.
Eyckmans, J. (1999). Strategy proof uniform effort sharing schemes for transfrontier pollution problems.
Environmental and Resource Economics, 14(2), 165–189.
Fankhauser, S. (1995). Valuing climate change: The economics of the greenhouse. London: Earthscan.
Finus, M., & Rundshagen, B. (2003). Endogenous coalition formation in global pollution control: a partition
function approach. In C. Carraro (Ed.), The endogenous formation of economic coalitions (pp. 199–
243). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Finus, M., Van Ierland, E., & Dellink, R. (2006). Stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game.
Economics of Governance, 7, 271–291.
Fuentes-Albero, C., & Rubio, S. J. (2010). Can the international environmental cooperation be bought? Eu-
ropean Journal of Operational Research, 202(1), 255–264.
Hoel, M. (1992). International environmental conventions: the case of uniform reductions of emissions. En-
vironmental and Resource Economics, 2, 141–159.
McEvoy, D. M., & Stranlund, J. K. (2009). Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with costly
monitoring for compliance. Environmental and Resource Economics, 42, 491–508.
McGinty, M. (2007). International environmental agreements among asymmetric nations. Oxford Economic
Papers, 59, 45–62.
Nagashima, M., Dellink, R., van Ierland, E. C., & Weikard, H.-P. (2009). Stability of international climate
coalitions—A comparison of transfer schemes. Ecological Economics, 68, 1476–1487.
Nordhaus, W. D. (1994). Managing the global commons: The economics of climate change. Cambridge: MIT
Press.
Nordhaus, W. D., & Boyer, J. (2001). Warming the world: Economic models of global warming. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Paltsev, S., Reilly, J. M., Jacoby, H. D., Eckaus, R. S., McFarland, J., Sarofim, M., Asadoorian, M., &
Babiker, M. (2005). The MIT emissions prediction and policy analysis (EPPA) model: version 4. MIT
joint program on the science and policy of global change. Report 125. Cambridge: MIT.
Rose, A., Stevens, B., Edmonds, J., & Wise, M. (1998). International equity and differentiation in global
warming policy. An application to tradeable emissions permits. Environmental and Resource Eco-
nomics, 12, 25–51.
68 Ann Oper Res (2014) 220:49–68
Rubio, S. J., & Ulph, A. (2007). An infinite horizon model of dynamic membership of international environ-
mental agreements. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 54, 296–310.
Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodels mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für
die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301–324 & 667–689.
Selten, R. (1975). Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory, 4, 25–55.
Tol, R. S. J. (1997). A decision-analytic treatise of the enhanced greenhouse effect. PhD-thesis, Amsterdam:
Vrije Universiteit.
Ulph, A. (2004). Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learn-
ing. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 29(1), 53–73.
Weikard, H.-P. (2009). Cartel stability under an optimal sharing rule. The Manchester School, 77(5), 599–
616.
Weikard, H.-P., Finus, M., & Altamirano-Cabrera, J. C. (2006). The impact of surplus sharing on the stability
of international climate agreements. Oxford Economic Papers, 58, 209–232.
Weikard, H.-P., Dellink, R., & Van Ierland, E. (2010). Renegotiations in the greenhouse. Environmental and
Resource Economics, 45, 573–596.
